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CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCES IN THE EUROPEAN 
ECONOMY: REBALANCING AND BEING COMPETITIVE IN A 
NON-OPTIMAL MONETARY UNION 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the structures, tendencies and challenges of the euro zone 
due to its non-optimal nature. The impact of the euro is asymmetric and 
contradictory: in the glorious ten first years a miracle and many bubbles 
appeared in some euro peripheral economies but they collapsed and enter in an 
inferno, in a trap despite its rescue by the European Union. The European 
challenges on competitiveness due to the deficits on productivity and 
competition are concentrated in the periphery. The virtuous euro zone states, 
reformed and applying ruled policies, have enlarged their competitiveness. The 
euroimbalances grew changing the convergence into huge divergences. 
The structural challenges of the European economy were propelled i) by the 
non-optimal condition of the euro zone, in particular the no movement of 
workers, the inflexibility of wages and costs and the no banking union; and b) by 
the European economic governance deficit, in particular the contradiction 
between a non-optimal monetary union and the divergent state’ fiscal policies.  
Europe is an anchor… or a torpedo. The euro zone and its member states are 
rebalancing, deleveraging and adjusting internally the economies, walking to be 
competitive. The Union is helping on this, reassessing the added value of 
Europe. Europe is coming to be an optimal currency area. 
Nevertheless the Union is suffering from two systemic risks: i) economic 
because of recession, public failure and credit crunch; and ii) institutional 
because of having no the instruments of his needs, the emerging 
euroscepticism, and the tendencies to the disintegration both of the Union and 
of certain member states. Then there is a need for Europe, acute in many 
countries. And there is a new task for the Union as regulatory quality developer 
and even as state builder. 
Key words: Stability, Competitiveness, European Monetary Union, Europe, 
Economic Policy. 
AUTOR 
FERRÁN BRUNET es Doctor en Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales y 
Profesor Titular de Economía Aplicada en la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. 
Su docencia e investigación se centran en la Economía Europea. Ha investigado 
en Política Económica, Hacienda Pública, Finanzas Locales y Renovación Urbana.  
Ha publicado una cuarentena de artículos y una decena de libros, entre ellos el 
Curso de Integración Europea (Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 2º ed. 2010) y un 
clásico del olimpismo (Economy of the Barcelona Olympic Games, Lausanne, 
International Olympic Committee, 1994).  
En temas europeos está trabajando y publicando sobre Nueva Gobernanza 
Económica Europea, Calidad de la Regulación, Déficit de Competencia, 
Competitividad, Estabilización y Reformas Estructurales y Modelo Socio-
económico Europeo. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Convergence and divergences in the european economy: rebalancing and being 
competitive in a non-optimal monetary union 
2 
 
Instituto Universitario de Análisis Económico y Social 
Documento de Trabajo 03/2013, 38 páginas, ISSN: 2172-7856 
ÍNDICE 
Índice ......................................................................................... 2 
1. Introduction ............................................................................. 3 
2. Elements and Dilemmas of the European Economic Governance ...... 6 
2.1. Economic Policy by Government vs. Economic Governance in a Multilevel 
System ................................................................................................ 6 
2.2. The European Way: The Forms of the EU System and the Formal and 
Policy Conditions for European Economic Governance ................................. 8 
2.3. The EU Competences in Economics .................................................... 9 
3. The European Economic Challenges: Being Competitive and 
Rebalancing in a Non-optimal Monetary Union .............................. 12 
3.1. Miracles, Bubbles and the Great Recession ........................................ 12 
3.2. The European Economic Deficits and Imbalances ............................... 13 
3.3. European Monetary Union and the Crisis: The Design of the EMU vs. MS 
Competitiveness and Policies ................................................................. 16 
4. The European Economic Governance Deficit ................................. 18 
4.1. The Failure of the European Economic Policy ..................................... 18 
4.2. The Failure of the MS Economic Policies ............................................ 20 
4.3. The Crisis of the PIGS: Convergence and Divergence in the European 
Socio-economic Model(s) ...................................................................... 21 
5. The European Union Economic and Political Challenges: The Twin 
Systemic Risks ......................................................................... 23 
5.1. European Economic Policy Challenges .............................................. 23 
5.2. European Political and Institutional Challenges: The EU Systemic Risks . 23 
5.3. The Long Road to a New European Economic Governance ................... 26 
6. Conclusion: the need for europe ................................................. 27 
7. References .............................................................................. 28 
 
  
Convergence and divergences in the european economy: rebalancing and being 
competitive in a non-optimal monetary union 
3 
 
Instituto Universitario de Análisis Económico y Social 
Documento de Trabajo 03/2013, 38 páginas, ISSN: 2172-7856 
1. INTRODUCTION 
he European Union (EU) is in a most delicate situation: The 
European economy is weathering a turbulent recession because of 
the financial instability and limited competitiveness of some EU 
Member States (MS) of the euro area. The EU's prospects don't look 
healthy. The EU has neither the power (because it doesn't have the 
necessary instruments) nor the willpower (because it doesn't have a 
political consensus) to rebalance the European economy. As usual, when 
politics doesn’t take economics into account, politics distorts economics.  
The twin presence of severe financial instability and structural non-
competitiveness has  generated a perfect and fatal storm in some euro 
area MS. Palliative measures taken by the MS, EU and the European 
Central Bank (ECB) such as the implementation of mechanisms for the 
financial stabilization of the euro area and the rescue programs of the 
sovereign debt of some MS with the participation of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), despite being well-executed, were not enough to 
avoid the contagion of the financial and banking system of many other 
MS. The MS debt crisis is having a cascade impact on banking and 
finance: both governments and banks can fail and attend together the 
bankruptcy. 
In blunt terms, there has been a collapse of the sovereign debt markets 
of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy (GIPSI)1  hindering the 
financing of the growing public deficit due to the growing gap between 
falling revenues and rising expenditures. All of these elements have 
conspired to provoke a serious recession (European Commission-DG 
ECFIN, 2010b)  
This is not the fall of the euro but of the GIPSI. The fall of the GIPSI and 
its tumultuous effects throughout the whole the EU is due to the general 
economic crisis, the structural limitations these countries have regarding 
competitiveness, the bursting of the financing, housing and general 
bubbles, the unruly MS policies that were only possible because of the 
cushy ECB monetary conditions for the quantity of money and its 
negative real price and, finally, the poor design of the European 
economic governance accompanying the euro (Edmund S. Phelps and 
Hans-Werner Sinn, eds., 2011). The structural limitations the European 
economy has regarding employment, productivity and competitiveness 
are most acute in the GIPSI. But other states such as France, Belgium, 
the United Kingdom and many of the newer MS are facing growing 
difficulties. 
The last decade has seen great developments in the European economy: 
the launch, rise and fall of the euro, the huge growth and depression of 
                                              
1 This acronym suggests variations on order (PIIGS), extensions (GIP, GIPS, 
GIPSI, GIPSIC, GIPSIF…) and allusions (Club MED…). 
T
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the GIPSI, their subsequent sovereign debt crisis, recession in many 
euro area MS, the success of the German and other virtuous economies, 
the growing divergence in the performances of the Nordic and central 
MS and the Southern and Eastern MS. But the structural limitations of 
the European economy - most of which manifest themselves through a 
limited capacity for competitiveness - and the current difficulties faced 
by the European economy related to the sustainability of public finance 
and the financial sector have been highlighted by the EU forms and the 
European economic governance deficit. Thus far, there does not seem to 
be any clear path towards the ending of financial instability and the 
addressing of competitiveness challenges (Brunet, 2013a). 
To paraphrase Jacques Delors, Europe does not have the instruments to 
realize its ambitions - and what is worse, Europe does not have the 
instruments to fulfil its needs. Indeed, the attainment of such is proving 
quite problematic.  
The EU's economic and political challenges, the urgent need for stability, 
competitiveness and governance and the incapability of overcoming 
these obstacles are generating grave systemic risks. Because of the 
euro and the public deficit in Europe, all debate on economic policy – 
which is still a competence of the MS – has been centred on the EU, its 
objectives, competences, policies, and, even more concretely, on its 
summits, meetings and dispositions. In reality, not all of the problems 
stem from to the euro, the instability in the euro area and the public 
deficit (Brunet, 2010b; Sinn and Timo Wollmershäuser, 2011 and 2012; 
Sinn, ed., 2012; and Philippine Cour-Thimann, 2013). Nevertheless, 
these problems are serious precisely because they are rooted in the 
limited competitiveness of the EU, in particular in the GIPSI’s 
competitiveness (or lack thereof). Thus the solutions for the euro area's 
problems are to be found not only in stabilization (monetary policy and 
the management of the public deficit, as austerity or as stimulus, in the 
current situation) but in structural reforms allowing the EU, and by 
extension the GIPSI, to be more competitive (Daniel S. Hamilton, 2011).  
The debate in the EU on the European economy and economic policy is 
varied and rich. This debate is especially welcome for the Europeanists: 
finally, European subjects are under serious discussion. The debate has 
a multitude of participants, with representatives of each culture being 
involved (Martin Feldstein, 2012; and Charles Wyplosz, 2012). The best 
and the worst arguments happen to be those addressing the European 
economy and economic policy (Brunet, 2012f). Finally, the main 
immediate problem (the sustainability of public budgets and their 
balance, the zero deficit) was discovered, but sometimes it is spoken of 
in simplistic terms, such as the opposition between austerity measures 
and the desire for growth and employment.  
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Figure 1 
The European Economic Governance Framework 
Source: Author conception. 
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2. ELEMENTS AND DILEMMAS OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC 
GOVERNANCE  
2.1. Economic Policy by Government vs. Economic Governance in 
a Multilevel System 
Governance is a more streamlined means of regulation developed not 
directly by government but by non-State entities. Governance is a 
growing phenomenon, especially in economic regulation in which 
competences and instruments are assigned to non-State organizations. 
In the EU, the growth of governance comes from two sources: the 
competences transferred from MS to national regulatory institutions and 
the competences transferred from MS to the EU (Brunet, 2008a, 2011a, 
2011b, 2012c, 2012d, and 2013d). The EU is a model place for 
governance because:  
a) It is a set of institutions which is not (yet) a State. In the EU, 
power does not emanate from the people and their parliament but from 
MS, with whom sovereignty remains (Nicolas Jabko, 2011).  
b) Economics is both the principle matter for the EU and the 
principle means through which governance is developed (Jean-François 
Jamet, Wernes Mussler and Stefaan De Corte, 2011). 
In such a fashion EU economic governance gradually grew, and 
continues to grow as part of the process of integration. The hegemony 
of MS in economic policy is being substituted by the hegemony of 
economic governance in the EU and by the EU. Thus a multilevel 
economic governance system is being developed in the EU – though 
dissonance is felt between MS economic policy determinations and those 
of the new EU economic governance. Usually the immediate winners are 
the MS, but this doesn’t last and the overall winner is the EU economic 
governance, which is strengthened to an even greater degree. 
A framework for European economic governance can be considered in 
Figure 1: in contexts ranging from economic fundamentals to the impact 
of the crisis; the early developments, from the implicit European 
economic constitution to the pre-crisis initiatives; the aims of the 
European economic governance, from stability to competitiveness; the 
European economic governance's instruments, such as ECB to Europe 
2020 policy; the initiatives and instruments proposed for European 
economic governance, from a Treaty to the euro break-up (Marshall 
Auerback, 2011); and some prospects for European economic 
governance (EU, 2010; and Council of the EU, 2012). 
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Figure 2:  
The Sources for European Economic Governance 
Source: Author conception. 
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Scrutinization of European economic governance will bring to the fore 
certain deficits, limitations and gaps, foremost being the gap between 
the current possibilities of European economic governance and the EU's 
economic governance needs. There is also a considerable gap between 
the economic policy and economic governance capabilities of the 
European economic governance and that of the United States (US) 
(Raymond J. Ahearn, coord., 2011), not to mention that between the 
European economic governance and the MS economic policy. These 
gaps, limitations and deficits to be found in European economic 
governance are acute and broadly-felt in the current great recession.  
2.2. The European Way: The Forms of the EU System and the 
Formal and Policy Conditions for European Economic Governance 
The EU is not just a State. Its specific forms have great sway on the 
specific developments of European economic governance; thus it follows 
that EU needs and prefers to work through consensus and unanimity, 
through gradual processes working for the economy, which always 
comes first (Brunet, 2011b). 
Compared with the usual aims and means available to most states, EU 
law and its policies and actions are limited by their international origin. 
Despite this, they are propelled forward by the immediate and direct 
effect of the EU law and its supremacy over of those of the MS. 
Similarly, the acquis communautaire is referred to in order to guarantee 
the attained level of integration and to impede backsliding. The EU is a 
construction of law and is maintained through law. The international 
origins through interstate treaty of EU law is complemented by EU 
derived law, of which both primary and secondary law have immediate 
and direct effect, and prevail over MS law. 
Nevertheless, the enormous power of EU determinations is making itself 
felt through the principle of subsidiarity, in that these need to be 
developed by the MS themselves. EU actions can be implemented 
through the community method, that is, directly through EU forms and 
instruments, or through interstate cooperation carried out in an 
international style which calls on  forms of intergovernmentalism, 
reinforced collaboration, variable geometry, among others, such as the 
open method of coordination.   
The EU is sometimes considered a soft power (Martin Heipertz and Amy 
Verdun, 2010; Brunet, 2012b; and World Bank, 2012b). This is because 
the contrast of the EU forms with those of the real States (as the MS 
are) and with those of the US (EEAG, 2011; and Robert L. Hetzel, 
2012). But it must also be taken into account that the EU is a soft power 
precisely because of its purposes, though these are frequently limited 
due to their shared development with the MS. Thus the integration 
process under the EU can be considered as following a liberal drift 
(Richard Münch, 2010). 
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2.3. The EU Competences in Economics 
The EU competences in economics can be based on those received from 
the MS as established in the treaties and derived law. More concretely, 
there is a list of the objectives and a list of matters (Brunet, 2010) for 
which the Council of the Union chooses the decisive method, through 
unanimity or simple majority. The principle of non-discrimination 
because of nationality or of equal treatment acts as the centre of the 
economic constitution of the EU. Applied to market, labour, capital and 
services matters, the principle is transformed into the four economic 
liberties, of which the mainstay is the internal market; the application to 
enterprises of the non-discrimination principle is the foundation of the 
common competition policy, itself the mainstay of the EU (House of 
Lords. EU Committee, 2012). 
Thus, being broader than an explicit economic constitution (Brunet, 
2008a), the principle of non-discrimination and the competition policy 
also serve to act as an implicit European economic constitution. 
Implicitly, the main EU economic constitution is that related to the free 
circulation of goods in the internal market and the common competition 
policy. The EU also displays originality regarding the institutions which 
manage competences in EP. There are different European institutions 
(the European Council, the Council of the Union, the European 
Commission, the European Parliament, the European Central Bank…) 
and they act in most original ways: under the leadership of the Council, 
under that of the MS ministers, and for debated matters, under the 
guidance of some MS presidents or prime ministers (European 
Commission, 2008). 
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Table 1 
Dilemmas and Debates on the European Economic Governance 
Some dilemmas on the European economic policy. Elements from different sides are mixed often 
Intergovernmentality, International Cooperation  Méthode communautaire 
Centralization Federalism 
Consensus, Unanimity  Majority 
Many speeds, Europe à la carte, permits degrees in 
deepening One speed, no degrees in deepening 
Discretion Rules 
Unruly Virtuous 
Primacy of politics Smart regulation 
Interventionist Liberal 
Macroeconomic, financial, (neo)Keynesian, left Microeconomic, real, (neo)classical, right 
Demand Supply 
Growth Competitiveness 
Market failure Policy failure 
Fiscal stimulus financed by issuing debt Austerity, rigor, efficiency 
Austerity trap Crowding out 
Financial engineering Sustainability of public finances 
Eurobonds No eurobonds 
Wishful thinking, Anaesthesia, Politically correct 
thinking Realism 
Too big to fail Failure 
 Bail out, rescue Bail in, no rescue 
EU alone IMF together with the EU 
Welfare state defence Structural Reforms of the economy 
MS  wrong policies producing public deficit and public 
debt EU good structural reforms proposals 
MS Over regulation EU Deficit of governance 
Keynesian-heterodoxy = new orthodoxy-
conservatism-money-distribution 
Hayekian-orthodoxy = new heterodoxy-politically incorrect-
real economy-production 
Regulationism Ordoliberalism  
Euro Break-up or split Euro exit Euro continuity 
Different orientations, sensibilities, structures, policies, needs and interests 
East GIPSCI France United Kingdom Germany Nordic 
Source: Author conception. 
 
Convergence and divergences in the european economy: rebalancing and being 
competitive in a non-optimal monetary union 
11 
 
Instituto Universitario de Análisis Económico y Social 
Documento de Trabajo 03/2013, 38 páginas, ISSN: 2172-7856 
The most part of Union policies are economic.2 The competence in 
economic policy is considered to belong to the MS, except when 
affecting the common market, as is the tradition. The coordination of MS 
economic policies as an imperative appeared early in the history of the 
European Communities but is really circumspect - at least practically. 
Thus the (economic) policies of MS (see Figure 2, left column) are 
always key for the EU, and they include matters related to the forms of 
society, representation, rule of law, foreign policies, labour and social, 
taxation, as well as general economic policy, such as fiscal and finance. 
 
 Figure 3 
Unemployment, Current Account and Public Balance: The Triplet Deficits 
in a Range of Countries 
 
Source:AMECO (2013), ECB (2013a and 2013b), European Commission (2013b), Eurostat 
(2013), fedStats (2013), IMF (2013b) and OECD (2013a). 
In 1999 came the European monetary union (EMU) for certain MS, 17 in 
2012. The EMU was the turning point in the European economic policy 
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Sapir, and Guntram B. Wolff, 2011; and Marsh, 2011): the MS whose 
currency was the euro had now left the monetary policy in the hands of 
the European Central Bank (ECB), despite the general competences in 
economic policy (including the fiscal policy) still belonged to the MS.  
                                              
2 As it directly affects people, social policy is essential for the EU. But the 
European social policy is logically centred on the free movement of people. 
The welfare policies (education, health, pensions, and their financing) are the 
competence of each MS. 
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A contradiction appears between Euro MS economic policy and EU 
monetary and fiscal policies (see Figure 2, right column). In the middle 
of these two policies the EU performs the traditional roles: from 
competition policy (horizontal policy) to internal policies (vertical 
policies), passing through the regional and territorial cohesion policy. 
Sometimes called microeconomic, these EU core policies are strategic, 
affecting the allocation of resources and having medium and long-term 
consequences, e. g. the benefits to be had in terms of competitiveness. 
3. THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CHALLENGES: BEING COMPETITIVE AND 
REBALANCING IN A NON-OPTIMAL MONETARY UNION 
3.1. Miracles, Bubbles and the Great Recession  
The European economic situation has passed from a one in which: 
- In the period 1999-2007, growth at an average of about two per cent 
a year, with the Southern and Eastern MS growing considerably more, 
and a sustained gap with the US (McKinsey Global Institute, 2010). 
- In the period 2008-2012, recession prevails: growth is higher in 
Northern and Southern (and some Eastern; Ewald Nowotny, Peter 
Mooslechner, and Doris Ritzberger-Grünwald, 2011; and Brunet, 2012b) 
MS have huge negative records in growth and in all public, foreign, 
labour market balances (Gerson Lehrman Group, 2010; and EEAG, 
2013).3 
The first phase provokes housing and banking bubbles. The second 
phase is the fruit of the bursting of the Southern (and Irish) bubbles, 
because of the credit from the rest of the euro zone. It follows that the 
success and fall of the South is due to the introduction of the euro and 
to its institutional limitations (a non-optimal currency area, no labour 
market or banking integration), to the uncompetitive structural 
conditions of the Southern countries, to the policy deficit of the EU and 
the policy choices (public deficit), all of which were thrown into shocking 
relief by the financial and economic crisis (EC. DG Economic and 
Financial Affairs, 2010a and 2010b).  
Both the introduction of the euro and the crisis underlined the need for 
competitiveness and the limitations of the EU and MS policies which 
hindered the performances of all of the Southern MS. The miracle of the 
euro and especially of the MED has been transformed into the 
martyrdom of the euro, the torture of public finance, and the rescue of 
the Southern MS. In Figure 4 (below) we can see the sequential 
development of the economic and financial crisis in Europe. 
                                              
3 For a powerful crisis timeline see ECB (2012a). 
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Table 2:  
The European Deficits 
 
MS Order: Grouped by 
origin and scored by 
smaller Competition 
Deficit.  
Sign for cells with: 
Regulator
y Quality 
Deficit 
Employment 
Deficit 
Productivity 
Deficit 
Competition 
Deficit 
Creativity 
Deficit 
Competitive-
ness Deficit 
Living Standard 
Deficit 
Human Deve-
lopment 
Index Deficit 
 Bad score < 15 for
col. 1; < 30 for 
the other cols. 
 
1 2       3 4 5   6 7 8 
‘Liberal’ 
Ireland -2.4 -3.0 -2 -17.6 -36 -16.8 -7.7 +0.8 
UK -2.0 +1.0 -18 -20.5 -21 -16.3 -23.1 -0.5 
Denmark -1.0 +5.0 -15 -20.8 -15 -9.1 -18.2 -0.2 
‘Nordic’ 
Netherlands -4.4 +1.6 -2 -23.2 -6 -12.1 -14.6 +0.2 
Finland -2.9 -0.4 -18 -25.2 -1 -14.1 -24.8 +0.1 
Sweden -7.3 +5.3 -11 -29.6 -8 -9.9 -22.3 +0.3 
‘Continental’ 
Luxembourg -1.5 -9.7 +43 -24.8 .. -14.8 +80.2 -0.7 
Belgium  -12.2 -8.6 -4 -28.5 -20 -20.7 -20.4 -0.5 
Germany -8.8 +0.3 -7 -28.8 -16 -14.0 -26.4 -1.6 
Austria -5.4 -0.6 -16 -30.0 -31 -16.4 -16.8 -0.3 
France -17.1 -5.2 -1 -34.6 -27 -21.3 -27.0 +0.1 
’Mediterranean’ 
Spain -18.0 -14.7 -22 -30.3 -35 -30.2 -33.9 -0.2 
Portugal -19.0 -1.2 -52 -35.7 -54 -33.2 -51.8 -5.4 
Italy -25.9 -12.8 -24 -37.5 -39 -38.2 -33.1 -1.0 
Greece -28.9 -8.3 .. -39.9 -42 -39.6 -37.5 -2.5 
Central and Eastern Large and Medium in Transition EU MS 
Hungary -14.1 -13.4 -53 -32.8 .. -35.2 -57.9 -7.7 
Bulgaria -33.7 .. .. -37.1 .. -39.7 -76.0 -12.7 
Romania -38.0 .. .. -38.5 .. -41.2 -75.8 -13.8 
Poland -30.7 -12.1 -62 -40.5 .. -38.3 -65.8 -8.1 
Newly Independent, Small and in Transition EU MS 
Estonia -7.8 .. .. -22.2 .. -23.4 -56.2 -9.1 
Cyprus -13.2 .. .. -28.7 .. -25.4 -39.7 -4.8 
Lithuania -18.5 .. .. -29.2 .. -32.3 -62.8 -8.9 
Slovakia -16.6 -7.1 -50 -31.3 .. -31.1 -59.0 -8.8 
Czech R. -20.5 -5.5 -56 -31.5 .. -28.5 -48.8 -6.0 
Latvia -17.6 .. .. -31.7 .. -22.2 -63.9 -9.6 
Malta -13.7 .. .. -34.0 .. -25.8 -51.2 -7.3 
Slovenia -27.3 .. .. -39.4 .. -31.5 -42.7 -3.4 
Candidates to the EU 
Croatia -38.5 .. .. -45.4 .. -40.3 .. -10.1 
FYR Macedonia -47.3 .. .. -38.9 .. -34.2 -67.8 -15.0 
Iceland .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Turkey -42.4 -24.3 -71 -39.2 .. -39.8 -81.0 -17.6 
Some EU Neighbours 
Albania -51.2 .. .. -36.7 .. -38.6 .. -15.0 
Bosnia & H.  -65.4 .. .. -46.3 .. -37.4 .. -14.8 
Montenegro  -62.4 .. .. -44.1 .. -31.0 .. .. 
Serbia -59.5 .. .. -46.0 .. -33.3 .. .. 
Norway -9.3 +3.6 -41 -31.0 .. -14.4 +21.2 +1.7 
Switzerland -6.8 +6.3 -20 -20.3 .. -5.6 -12.1 +0.4 
For Reference 
United States -6.3 0.0 [75.3] 0 [$50,400] -19.4 0 [0.73] 0.0 [5.67] 0.0 [$36,300] 0.0 [95.1] 
Canada -5.9 +3.1 -18 -19.8 .. -11.5 -18.5 -1.0 
Japan -12.7 -1.7 -29 -27.5 .. -17.1 -26.4 +0.2 
China -53.7 .. .. -47.2 .. -19.4 .. -17.4 
For columns numbered 1 and 4 the reference value is 100. For the other columns the reference values are that of the US [in 
brackets]. 
Source: Author calculations on data for 2012 or closer year available and from AMECO (2013), Bertelsmann 
Stiftung (2012), DICE (2013), Eurostat (2013), IMF (2013a), INSEAD (2013), fedStats (2013), OECD (2013a 
and 2013b), UN (2013), WB (2013a and 2013b), and WEF (2011 and 2013). 
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3.2. The European Economic Deficits and Imbalances 
Europe is generating a) considerable and ever-growing gaps between its 
economy and that of the US (Martin Neil Baily and Jacob Funk 
Kirkegaard, 2004; Brunet, 2008a; Alberto Alesina and Francesco 
Giavazzi, 2006); and b) equally considerable and ever-growing gaps 
between many MS and some of the more advanced MS. As we can see 
in Table 2, the deficits in regulatory quality, employment, productivity, 
competition, creativity, competitiveness, living-standard, and human 
development index are serious. All considered these indicators show the 
different economic models existent in Europe: liberal; Nordic, 
continental, Mediterranean; Central and Eastern, large and medium in-
transition MS; and newly-independent, small and in-transition MS. 
From 1999 and the birth of the EMU, there has been serious growth in 
current account imbalances between different MS. As the global 
imbalances grew (Olivier Blanchard and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, 2009; 
and EEAG, 2012), in Europe the euroimbalances between different MS 
was on the rise: current accounts surpluses in Continental and Nordic 
MS of around 6 per cent of the GDP corresponded to current accounts 
deficits in MED of between 6 and 12 % of the GDP (Silvia Merler and 
Pisani-Ferry, 2012; and Sinn, 2013a). The growing euroimbalances and 
Target imbalances are the expression of the growing competition in a 
non-optimal monetary area. The economic agents of the less 
competitive countries were able to finance their deficits, at least in the 
first stage of the euro, in which the risk prime again the German assets 
was no sensible (Marsh, 2011; Sinn, 2012b, Cour-Thimann, 2013; and 
Daniel Gros, 2013). 
It is all too clear that the growing euroimbalances are the fruit of the 
asymmetrical impact of the EMU. In place of convergence there is a 
marked divergence between the Northern and Southern European 
countries (Robert Solow and Hamilton, eds. 2011). Here follows a 
compendium of the European deficits shown in the light of the 
differences between EU standards and those of the US, which are 
nothing if not acute - and are growing in certain MS (see Table 2): 
- Employment deficit: The gap in employment is huge, as is 
unemployment; both are crippling productive capabilities and raising 
social costs (Eurostat, 2012).  
- Productivity deficit: Because of the lower use of labour in Europe, the 
average working total is around 1500 hours a year in most EU MS, 
compared with around 1800 in the US (Eurostat, 2012; and fedStats, 
2012). 
- Competition deficit: Owing to MS over-regulation, despite efforts at 
Europeanization (Brunet, 2008b). 
- Regulatory quality deficit: An intelligent means of regulation is a long 
way off for many European countries (Brunet, 2012c). 
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Table 3 
Twin Imbalances in the European Non-optimal Monetary Union 
Source: Author conception based on this paper and on AMECO (2013), BIS (2013), Brunet 
(2013b), DICE (2013), ECB (2013a and 2013b), European Commission (2013b), Eurostat 
(2013), IMF (2013b) and (OECD (2013a). 
Topics and Tendencies in a Non-optimal Monetary Zone 
Core EMU 
competitive, virtuous, successful 
Indicator, aspect Peripheral EMU 
uncompetitive, unruly, failed 
C. 2013-2020 B. 2007-
2013 
A. 1999-
2007 
Approximate Periods A. 1999-
2007 
B. 2007-
2013 
C. 2013-2020 
Internal 
Revaluation 
Recession Stable General Drive Bubble 
Great 
Recession 
Rebalancing 
and Internal 
U stable U 1. GDP trend UU VV V 
U U stable 2. GDP per capita UU V V 
positive negative 3. Output Gap (GDP 
trend - Potential GDP) 
positive negative 
U U U 4. Employment Rate U V estable 
V V U 5. Unemployment Rate V UU U 
V V U 6. NAIRU V U U 
stable reduction over 7. Savings Rate under growing 
growing stable under 8. Consumption Rate over under 
stable U stable 9. Manufacture V VV U 
U stable 10. Construction and Civil 
Works 
UU VV V 
U U stable 11. Productivity VV U U 
U stable V 12. Labour Costs UU V VV 
VV U UU 13. Real Exchange Rate UU V VV 
VV U UU 14. Current Accounts - 
Euroimbalances 
VV U U 
UU U U 15. Public Deficit & Debt UU U stable 
UU U U 16. Price Inflation U U stable 
V U U 17. Stock Market UU U V 
U U stable 18. Banking Credit UU VV U 
VV VV VV 19. Target2 financing UU UU UU 
no 20. Bail out & Rescue 
Programs 
yes ? 
stable growing 21. Credit Delinquency 
Rate 
stable VV V 
deleveraging stable 22. Private Sector Debt UU deleveraging 
V UU UU 23. Net International 
Investment Position 
VV VV U 
U UU stable 24. Labour Mobility in the 
EU  
no scanty U 
U U U 25. Immigration from 
outside EU 
UU stable negative 
scanty 26. Labour Market Quality scanty U 
growing 27. Regulatory Quality V ? 
stable 28. Governance Quality V ? 
U UU 29. Competitiveness 
Ranking Level 
VV V U 
yes 30. Sound Credit excess deficit 
U stable 31. Welfare State UU V VV 
virtuous 32. Economic Policies unruly trial virtuous 
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- Creativity deficit: In the main field of the knowledge economy, Europe 
is far behind the US (INSEAD, 2012). 
- Competitiveness deficit: Enormous current accounts deficits highlight 
the muted performance of many MS (Brunet, 2010b). 
- Living-standard and Human Development Index deficits: European 
social protection balances the deficits in other areas but many MS and 
third European countries have considerable room for improvement (UN, 
2012).  
– Convergence deficit: As a result of these asymmetrical conditions and 
their consequences, there has been a cease in the catching-up process - 
the divergences between MS, and between the EU and the US, are 
growing. 
3.3. European Monetary Union and the Crisis: The Design of the 
EMU vs. MS Competitiveness and Policies 
The EMU underwent three phases: a) from the European Monetary 
System, in which currencies were floated together, and to the EMU 
through to the Maastricht criterion (from 1993 to 1999); b) from the 
launch of the euro to the financial and economic crisis (1999-2007-
2009); and c) from the sovereign debt crisis to the present (2009-
2012).  
The first two stages of the EMU were very successful (Pisani-Ferry and 
Posen, eds., 2009; and Marsh, 2011), but the third stage is certainly a 
problematic one. The first stage brought about a convergence in 
financial indicators, and the second stage enormous growth, especially 
in the less advanced euro MS, because of the quantity and price of 
credit. Inversely, at that time, owing to its reunification, Germany was 
the millstone around Europe's neck! The third stage provoked an 
immense crisis, especially among the less competitive euro area MS, as 
a consequence of the drying up of cheap credit and financing of the 
structural imbalances in public budget and in current accounts. Thus we 
can see that the MED are adding to the already high price of the crisis 
the price of their limited competitiveness and of being part of a non-
optimal monetary area. 
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Figure 4 
Sequences of the Euro Crisis 
 
 
 
Treaty 
 on EU    
(1993) 
ÆPolitical union  
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Monetary Union 
project 
• Financial 
convergence on 
Maastricht 
criterion 
ÆEuro 
launch! 
(1999) 
• ∆ Credit 
access 
• Lowering 
interest 
rates 
Æ Economic 
Boom  
 
È
 
 
 
 
 
Æ
• Rescues: banks, insurers, 
carmakers… 
• Fiscal stimulus (∆ public 
expenditure). 
• Easy monetary policy 
(liquidity & negative 
interest rates). 
• Austerity, sustainability of 
public accounts. 
ÅEcono- mic 
Policy Answers 
Å Crisis - 
American financial 
crash (2007) 
• Housing 
• Banking 
• Credit 
• Labour costs 
• Immigration 
Å Bubbles 
Great 
Recession Æ 
• Public deficits  
• Æ ∆ Public debt. 
• L GDP 
• K Unemployment 
• K Euroimbalances 
• LPerformances, 
confidence, ratings 
• Analyses: Macroeconomic imbalances; Banking 
Impact, TARGET2. 
• Debates: All kind of proposals, engineering and 
occurrences. 
• MS Positions: DE, FR, UK, GR, IT, ES, PL, CZ… 
 
 
È 
 
 
 
Å 
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Æ
 
 
Rescues!  
Sovereign Debt Crisis Å 
         ↕                 
Banking Crisis Å 
EU Policies and Initiatives: 
• ECB easing. 
• Stability and Growth Pact Æ European Semester, Fiscal 
Compact Æ new Treaty. 
• European Financial Stability Mechanism(s). 
• Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedures. 
• Greece: V-2010 (110,000 M€)+ VII-2011 
(158,000 M€)+X-2011 (130,000 M€) 
• Ireland: IX-2010 (85,000 M€) 
• Portugal: V-2011 (78,000 M€) 
• Spain: VI/X-2012 (100,000 M€) 
 
Æ EU Challenges 
 
• Economic: Globalization, ageing, 
competitiveness, internal market, 
stabilization and structural reforms. 
• Politics: Europeanization, divergences 
and euroscepticism. 
• Social: Welfare, cohesion and 
inclusion. 
Source: Author conception. 
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4. THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE DEFICIT  
4.1. The Failure of the European Economic Policy 
European economic governance was never developed to a serious 
degree, as the main economic policy competences remained with the MS 
(as seen above in Figure 2) and the design of the EMU had serious 
shortcomings (Franklin Allen, Elena Carletti and Giancarlo Corsetti, eds., 
2011). In fact, there is a deficit of European economic governance, gaps 
between various needs and the means of fulfilling them, only being 
further highlighted by the current crisis. Despite all this, it is possible to 
reduce this deficit by means of initiatives in development since Fall 2009 
(see Table 4 below). 
Usually, EU policies are well-empowered. This is the case for policies 
based on subsidies, as are the agricultural and regional policies; it is 
even also the case that certain European policies which have regulation 
as an instrument are backed up by decisive implementation, e.g. 
competition, but this is due to the force of the Community method 
(Brunet, 2010). Inversely, most of the hindrances to the empowerment 
of EU policies were because  their implementation was the competence 
of the MS, and sometimes powerful incentives to avoid the 
empowerment of EU policies can make themselves known, as happened 
with two key policies which wield heavy influence over the current EU 
economic governance problems:  
a) The fiscal policy known as the Stability and Growth Pact (with the 
supplement of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines), its progress was 
hindered not by the absence of rules but by the little respect with which 
it was regarded (Robert J. Samuelson, 2008; John B. Taylor, 2012; 
Brunet, 2013b; and Wyplosz, 2013).4  
b) The EU structural reform policy known as the European Initiative for 
Growth, renamed the Lisbon Strategy for 2010, then Europa 2020 and 
now Compact for Growth and Jobs, it was placed under the cover of the 
open method of national coordination designed for the mutual 
understanding of and the education about the good practices of the MS. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
4 From 1999 to 2011 the SGP was violated 97 times: of these only 29 were 
permitted (because of recession). Despite the sanctions in case of violation 
previewed in the SGP, no one has been imposed (EEAG, 2011: 79). 
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So we see that the more general and key EU economic policies failed, 
both the more discretionary ones and those completely implemented by 
the MS, as well as the structural reforms and numerous EU rules and 
sanctions based on the SGP. European economic governance is a 
cemetery of wishful-thinking slogans: Open Method of Coordination of 
Economic and Social Policies, Sustainability of Public Finance, Excessive 
Deficit Procedure, Early Policy Advice and Warming Procedure 
Macroeconomic Dialogue (Köln Process), Multilateral Supervision, 
Employment Pact, European Employment Strategy (good practices, 
excellence, flexisecurity), Convergence and Reform Programs and 
Structural Policies Coordination (Cardiff Process)… (House of Lords. EU 
Committee, 2012) Underlying the deficit and failure of European 
economic governance, there is one even bigger failure: that of the 
Constitution for Europe, published in the Official Journal in 2004, 
abandoned in 2007 after the negative results in the Dutch and French 
referenda (Jabko, 2011). 
 
 
Table 4 
The Dynamics of the European Governance in Times of Crisis 
 Pre-existing 2007 and substantially maintained New, modified or additional 
In
it
ia
ti
v
e
s 
 European economic constitution (EU treaties and derived 
law). 
 Competition Policy and the other EU Policies. 
 European Recovery Plan. 
 EMU, Stability and Growth Pact (preventive and 
dissuasive arms; for each MS: stability program and 
convergence and structural reform program), Excessive 
Deficit Procedure, Early Warming Mechanism and Policy 
Advice.  
 Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, Macroeconomic 
Dialogue and Multilateral Supervision. 
 Economic Governance Package: broader and enhanced 
surveillance, effective enforcement of budgetary 
surveillance in the euro area; European Semester on 
the MS budgetary framework; preventing and 
correcting macroeconomic imbalances (by the EC), 
enforcement mechanisms Æ ‘fiscal compact’ Æ Treaty 
on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union. 
 Competitiveness Pact for the Euro Æ Euro Plus Pact. 
Surveillance of intra-euro area imbalances, alert 
mechanism through a scoreboard, excessive imbalance 
procedure (EIP, by peer pressure, and fine of 0,1 % 
GDP). 
 Reinforced Multilateral Surveillance. 
 Single Market Strategy.  
 Employment Pact, European Employment Strategy, 
Flexisecurity, Social Agenda. 
 Open Method of Coordination of Economic and Social 
Policies. 
 
 Lisbon Strategy for the Structural Reforms of the 
economy   Æ Structural Policies Coordination. 
 Æ Europe 2020. 
 Balance of Payments assistance (BoP, following the 
Community method, administered by the European 
Commission). 
 BoP assistances for Hungary, Latvia and Romania. 
 Macro-financial Assistance to non-EU countries.   
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4.2. The Failure of the MS Economic Policies 
The EU has failed in its economic governance. This is because of the 
forms of the EU and the complexity of the intergovernamentality not to 
mention the tatonment practice, the absence of course (Taylor, 2012) 
and the submission of the MS policies to the electoral game. This is the 
case for the dialectics of stimulus vs. austerity, in particular the 
management of the fiscal balance (Raghuram G. Rajan, 2010; and Jean-
Claude Trichet, 2011). What should be the main deficit, the policy 
priority: the demand deficit (related to general economic crisis and 
recession) or the public accounts deficits?  
Will the current economic difficulties be checked by reducing the 
demand deficit and enlarging it with public debt? (National Commission 
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s 
a
n
d
 b
o
d
ie
s 
 Council: ECOFIN. 
 Commission: DG EcFin and other DG related to the 
Economic Policies (Competition, Market, Enterprise, 
Trade, Employment). 
 European Investment Bank (EIB). 
 Economic and Social Committee (ESC). 
 European financial stabilization: 
A. Institutions (agencies or bodies): European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), established 8 October 2012 by the 
corresponding Treaty, is a permanent body to 
safeguard the financial stability in the euro area as a 
whole. It provides financial assistance to euro area MS 
experiencing or being threatened by severe financing 
problems. The ESM prolongs the European Financial 
Stabilization Mechanism (ESFM, established 9 May 
2010 under the community method). As part of the 
overall rescue package of 700 billion €, the ESM is able 
to issue bonds for up 440 billion € guaranteed by the 
euro area MS, the other provided by the EU through 
the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF, created 
by the Euro area Member States as Luxembourg-
registered company owned by the euro area MS, and 
under the intergovernmental method, who gives 60 
billion €) and the IMF (200 billion €). The ESM has 
been assigned the best possible credit ratings (there 
are AAA, by S&P and Fitch Ratings, and Aaa by 
Moody’s).  
B. Packages of Financial and Economic Support: For 
Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain (only banks cajas) 
and Cyprus. 
 European Bank of Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD). 
 Economic and Financial Committee (EFC). 
 Economic Policy Committee (EPC). 
 Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the 
European Parliament. 
 Following the launch of the European Systemic Risk 
Board (ESRB) on 16 December 2010, three European 
supervisory authorities start their work for the 
supervision of financial activities with regard to banks, 
markets and insurances and pensions, respectively: 
European Banking Authority (EBA), European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority 
(EIOPA). A Joint Committee of these three European 
supervisory authorities exists from 2011. 
 Eurogroup: MS’ ministries of Economy and Finance, 
chaired by Jean-Claude Juncker and by Jeroen 
Dijsselbloem. 
 Task Force on Economic Governance chaired by the 
President of the European Council, Herman Van 
Rompuy working on financial assistance banking 
integration. 
 
 European Central Bank   Securities Markets Programme. 
 Outright Monetary Transactions. 
 Unconventional measures. 
Source: Author conception on Council of the European Union (2012), European Commission (2008, 2012a, and 
2012b), European Commission-DF ECFIN (2010a, and 2013), and European Union (2012). 
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on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis, 2011) Or on the 
other hand, is the way to recovery the shortening of the public deficit 
via reducing expenditures in a context of fall in revenue (fiscal scissors)? 
Faced by such dilemmas, the moment comes when markets cut out 
(Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, 2009): when there is no more 
confidence in the capabilities of countries to return credit, the financing 
of public deficit is stopped. Ongoing and deeply structural, the deficit in 
public accounts is a great hindrance for growth and a considerable 
economic and social cost (IMF, 2012a). As in budgeting in economic 
policy, MS have little room to manoeuvre. ‘Compete or borrow’ is an 
expression for times gone by: now it is impossible to borrow, the only 
course left is to compete. But there is a significant gap in competition 
and in the other MS policies on the labour market and social policies. 
Most of the other regulations don’t help competition at all. Such as it is, 
two advancements in EU direction are proving to be of some help: a) the 
passing from discretion to rules; and b) greater capability of 
empowering the rules (République française. Sénat, 2010). 
European policy seems to be nothing but cheap talk, a bazaar the 
European Union provides for all kinds of purposes given the name of 
‘policies’ (European Commission, 2008), but not exactly implemented as 
such. Thus, questions regarding the effectiveness and the efficiency of 
European economic policy are most pertinent.   
4.3. The Crisis of the PIGS: Convergence and Divergence in the 
European Socio-economic Model(s) 
PIGS are in serious turmoil because of: a) the general crisis and their 
previous boom dynamics; b) their own economic structures and policies; 
b) their inability to manage their liquidity deficits; and c) European 
economic governance deficit. The crisis of the MED is the engine of the 
euro crisis, a sovereign debt crisis founded in MED competitiveness 
deficit. Here we have the rise and fall of MED, the miracle turned into an 
inferno (Brunet, 2012e, 2013a, and 2013c; Sinn, 2013b).  
The collapse of the PIGS raises serious questions about the European 
socio-economic model(s):  
−  Do the current growing material divergences between the failing 
Southern MS and the successful Northern MS make up the prelude to 
a formal convergence into one European economic model? 
−  Is the European welfare state sustainable? Probably, but only with 
reforms: the non-competitiveness of the Southern MS is the first 
stage of a major medium and long-term European non-
competitiveness. 
−  What is the place of the EU? The bailouts decided upon need to be 
sustained with state-building tasks, avoiding unruly policies and 
introducing hard reforms of the non-performing structures. 
Convergence and divergences in the european economy: rebalancing and being 
competitive in a non-optimal monetary union 
22 
 
Instituto Universitario de Análisis Económico y Social 
Documento de Trabajo 03/2013, 38 páginas, ISSN: 2172-7856 
Figure 5 
Regulatory Quality and Competitiveness in the EU MS 
 
Panel A. Regulatory Quality and Competitiveness
 
Panel B. Governance Quality and Competitiveness
 
Source: Brunet (2013d). 
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5. THE EUROPEAN UNION ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CHALLENGES: 
THE TWIN SYSTEMIC RISKS  
5.1. European Economic Policy Challenges 
The current financial crisis and economic recession is accentuating the 
challenges to the EU economy, because of the deficits (see Table 2), and 
to its economic policy, because of the MS and EU forms and the 
dilemmas they address (see Table 1). These economic and economic 
policy challenges can be synthesized into one pressing need: to be 
competitive in the global economy. In this context, Europe has certain 
advantages, such as high productivity, and certain disadvantages, such 
as considerable welfare protection. But the main immediate problem for 
the EU is that it lacks the instruments to address this ordeal - both the 
short-term tools related to fiscal and banking stabilization and the 
medium and long-term tools related to structural reforms are in the 
hands of the MS, and usually they are not encouraged to use them 
because of their suspected political costs.  
Another perspective of the situation is to be seen in the MS who 
addressed the economic and economic policy challenges with virtuous 
fiscal and structural policies and are now among the performing 
countries for which the recession is passing away without serious 
financial turbulence. This is the success of the first to reform. From this 
we can see the asymmetrical impact of the crisis because of the 
different structural abilities of various MS to compete, not to mention 
their economic policy choices. For the EU, the challenges of stabilization 
and competitiveness manifest themselves in the guise of the unruly 
PIGS crying for help to the virtuous Nordics. The longer this fiscal crisis 
continues, the higher the possibility of a welfare state bankruptcy. 
5.2. European Political and Institutional Challenges: The EU 
Systemic Risks 
As usual in the European integration process, politics follow economics. 
The EU is undergoing the double critical process of developing 
institutional forms to satisfy the economic and economic policy 
challenges which arose from European monetary union developments, 
e.g. the sovereign debt crisis in the MED. The Union’s political and 
institutional challenges are as daunting as its economic challenges. 
There is a compositum between one and the other. This overlap helps to 
nurture two systemic risks: 
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Box 1  
25 Theses on the European Economy 
 
- Economic systemic risk: The financing of public deficit by credit 
generates a) a crowding effect of enterprises from financing, reducing 
investment, employment and GDP; that is, a general recession of the 
economic system; and b) a systemic banking risk borne of the 
government's danger of defaulting. Upon this, the financing of sovereign 
states and their failure will be accompanied by the failure of banks and 
thus economic turmoil. The complexity and insufficiencies of the EU are 
accentuating the economic risks of the MS (Wolff, 2012).  
 
 
Subjects: Convergence and Divergences – Euro: Core and Periphery - Rebalancing - Being Competitive in 
the European Non-optimal Monetary Area – The New European Economic Governance – The Union: Anchor 
or Torpedo - The Need for Europe – The Union’ New State Builder - Governance and  Regulatory Quality  
 
1. Two systemic risks have the European Union: On the economy because of financial and 
competitiveness challenges; and political because of no the instruments of its needs. 
2. Dynamics: Especially for the periphery, there is a first euro phase until 2010 (Greece bail out) with 
bubbles in credit, housing and costs and a second phase in which serious disequilibria appeared. 
3. Crisis: In the euro zone and on activity, public accounts, and current accounts, and because a) the 
euro in a non-optimal monetary zone; and b) the competitiveness deficit of peripheral euro MS.  
4. European imbalances: The current accounts deficits of periphery correspond with the surplus of the 
euro core countries, the ECB and the Target system baking the financial balancing,  
5. The euro is non-optimal currency union because: i) workers don’t moves and wages are inflexible 
thus the balance is not by salaries but by unemployment; and ii) there is no a banking union, the 
surpluses remain in the banks of the euro zone core. 
6. Deficit of competitiveness is what the crisis is underlying: The euroimbalances results of differences in 
productivity and competitiveness.  
7. A very European sin is the over regulation, rests of the tradition of Jacobinism and interventionism. 
8. European deficits are the so called democratic deficit, as well as that on employment, productivity, 
competition, and on economic governance. 
9. European economy is deleveraging, rebalancing, by internal devaluation. 
10. Being competitive is the final result of the joint processes and of smart policies that should shorten 
the process. 
11. Stability and competitiveness: Mixing austerity, specially the reduction of expenditures with structural 
reforms, that’s stabilizing and being competitive. 
continue… 
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Box 1 (conclusion) 
25 Theses on the European Economy  
- Political systemic risk: A malaise is growing among the MS and the EU 
because of the inability to turn around these economic difficulties, some 
of them due to government fiscal deficit financing and the special EU 
forms and policy. The inability of MS and EU to settle contradictions is 
due to the euro-immobilism (old Europe, protectionism…; Alesina and 
Giavazzi, 2006; Baily and Natalie McGarry, 2011; and Waltraud 
Schelkle, 2012) and generates euro-scepticism (from both extremes, 
xenophobia…). MS governments are deeply afraid to adopt stabilization 
and reform measures, despite their urgent need (OECD, 2011a; and C. 
Fred Bergsten and Funk Kirkegaard, 2012).  
 
12. Austerity -there is the cuts in public expenditures necessary to balance the falling revenues and then to 
reduce the public deficit- is also a need because i) there is no more money nor access to credit; and ii) 
it’s favouring the structural reforms. 
13. The economic ideology of the Europeans is predominantly politically correct, anti competitive and 
protectionist. 
14. The traditional mix between the MS over regulation and the European economic governance deficit is 
turning to a smart multi level economic regulatory system. Regulatory utopia 
15. Public deficit: in the intersection between fiscal and monetary policies, and between public finance 
failure and financial risks, is the key element of the economic policy. 
16. Often without course, for economic governance the establishment and empowerment of rules is 
essential to limit discretionary governments. 
17. Europe, the EU subjects are appearing as an element of the national political confrontation between 
competitive political parties, especially in front of elections. Europe, fabric for unity, is now an element 
for division´ 
18. Europeanization favours the regulatory quality.  
19. State builder task: Is new for the Union 
20. The liberty of Europe: Europe is a guaranty for the liberty of MS and of citizen. 
21. The European leadership is difficult to assume for a MS. 
22. Integration vs. Disintegration: The process of unification helps the tendencies of regions to secession 
23. Europe, anchor or torpedo: Europe helps MS to be virtuous and penalize the unruly policies. 
24. There is a need for Europe, bigger in the new independent small MS coming from socialism, and also for 
the euro periphery. 
25. Europe is the last utopia.  
Source: Author conception. 
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With these two correlated systemic risks, the EU (and many MS) faces a 
high risk of collapse.5 Some principal MS remain out of the debate and 
even out of the new agreements; some are holding referenda regarding 
their ties with the EU - the break-up of the EU appears to be an even 
more realistic proposition than the dissolution of the euro. 
5.3. The Long Road to a New European Economic Governance 
Just as the EMU aspires to be an optimal currency area and MS to be 
competitive, the EU aspires to meet its challenges and beat its systemic 
risks. The dilemmas to be resolved, the debates to be expounded upon 
and the decisions to be made by MS and EU are great. But there is also 
a consensus on the European Economic Governance. A European 
Consensus6 can be expressed in this Decalogue for the New European 
Economic Governance: 
1. Social Market Economy: Competitive (Efficiency-Competition) and 
Welfare State (Justice-Solidarity) (as in Brunet 2008a). 
2. Public Finance: Equilibrium and Sustainability (OECD, 2011b and 
2012). 
3. Labour Market: Flexisecurity. 
4. Competitiveness: Productivity for Mass Consumption and Welfare. 
5. Environment: Sustainable and Responsible.  
6. Sound Credit and Deleverage (Charles Roxburgh et al. 2010; and 
Greta Krippner, 2011). 
7. Policy Mix Objectives: Austerity & Growth & Inclusion (IMF, 2011b 
and 2013b). 
8. Policy Mix Instruments: Stabilization & Structural Reforms & 
Economic Governance. 
9. European Regulation / European Economic Governance: Smart, pro-
competitive and market oriented. 
10. European Union: Multilevel Governance system avoiding over-
regulation and following a liberal drift (Münch, 2010). 
Perhaps there is a broad consensus about the above concepts, but what 
appears more immediately is confrontation: government vs. opposition, 
                                              
5  Does integration promotes disintegration? The secession of regions: a) is a 
MS phenomena but one fostered by the EU integration and its crisis; and b) 
could have tremendous consequences, not only for many MS but also for the 
entire European integration process, a precious outcome of  recent history 
and the last utopia… therein lies a new and stiff challenge for the EU. 
6  Variations, extensions and allusions are allowed: Brussels-Frankfurt-Berlin-
Paris Consensus. 
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MS vs. EU, stimulus vs. sustainability, the austerity trap vs. 
competitiveness deficit… The instruments needed to face these 
dilemmas suffer from a) an excess of indetermination and visibility, 
despite political correctness and technocratic language, and b) the EU 
limited abilities in making and implementing the decisions.  
The European way is the only common course possible, but it comes at 
a cost. With the sovereign crisis, the road to European economic 
governance is a long one (see Figure 4 and Table 4), and the people, 
the economy, MS and the EU need to reap its rewards now. 
6. CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR EUROPE 
he European monetary union, the financial flows and the euro itself 
are facing huge risks because of the instability and lack of 
competitiveness of some MS. The competitiveness deficit is due to 
their economic structural limitations and unruly policies, the non-
optimal monetary area that is the euro zone and the absence of 
complexity of the institutions of the financial union, and to the deficit in 
European economic governance. After a considerable credit bubble, the 
economic and financial crisis has pushed competition inside the euro 
zone. The MS are showing serious imbalances between themselves, in 
the form of huge surpluses in virtuous Nordic economies and huge 
deficits in non-performing Southern economies.  
The conjunction of instability and lack of competitiveness produced a 
perfect storm to weather the structures of the euro and the 
management of the public deficit and debt of the MED. The future of the 
euro depends on the ability of the South to be more competitive and 
advance toward an optimal currency area. The EU has worked as an 
anchor for virtuous policies, impelling them, but it can also turn into a 
torpedo when countries behave in an unruly fashion. Europe is gradually 
bypassing MS over-regulation and turning from a EU governance deficit 
to a liberal multilevel economic governance system. The EU is taking on 
an immense state-building task, favouring regulatory quality, 
competitiveness and socio-economic performance. 
The EU acts as an anchor favouring virtuous policies… or as a torpedo 
for unruly policies. The building of states is not a primary EU objective 
but a happy consequence. MS can only be virtuous and competitive… 
and they will be helped by the Union to achieve this. There is a need for 
Europe; the benefits of membership greatly outweigh the costs of 
cooperation. There are degrees in the need for Europe as seen in the 
variances between Portugal and the UK, Sweden and Estonia, Poland or 
the Czech Republic… a collapse and disintegration of the EU will push a 
lot of countries into hell, the most benign form of which is over-
regulation and misery. Finally, the achievement of the Union is the 
success of the fostering of freedom, civilization and progress. 
T
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